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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
HYRUM JENKINS and BELLE MO·YLE 
JENKINS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHN B MORGAN, WILLIS MO·RGAN, 
ALBERT MORGAN, BERT MORGAN, 
ETHEL G. MORGAN, M. L. BUXTON, 
'and MILO BURSTON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 7826 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
The statement .of the so-called facts contained in appel-
lants' brief is so limited in its scope that in our view much 
of the evidence of controlling importance is omitted there-
from. We are unable to agree with appellants' statement 
made on pages 3 and 4 of appellants' brief, to the effect that 
the issue involved is whether or not the measure of dam-
age of the value for the use for the withholding of the prop-
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erty by the defendants from the plaintiffs is to be based 
upon the value of use as grazing ground-or the value of 
the use as agricultural ground. 
In our view the fundamental question before this Court 
is: Does the evidence adduced at the trial require as a 
matter of law a larger judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
than that awarded by the trial court? In order to deter-
mine that question it is, in our view, necessary to consider 
a substantial part of the evidence offered and received at 
the trial which is not mentioned in appellants' brief. We shall 
briefly direct the attention of the Court to such additional 
evidence. 
, The land involved in this controversy is located near 
Goshen, in the southwesterly part of Utah ~County. On 
September 1947 when a supersedeas bond was executed for 
the purpose of permitting the defendants in this action to 
retain possession of the lands for which damage is claimed 
for the withholding thereof, such lands were, and for many 
. years prior thereto had been, covered with sagebrush and 
native grasses and weeds (Tr. 77). (Note: We are using 
the page numbers at the bottom of the Transcript.) It had 
not been used for raising agricultural crops· for at least 30 
. . 
years prior to time of the trial of this cause (Tr. 65; 95). 
On May, 17, 1947, plaintiff, Hyrum Jenkins, and one David 
S. Powelson entered into a contract, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, 
whereby it was agreed that Powelson desired to purchase 
the land involved in this litigation if Jenkins was successful 
in the litigation to acquire the same. That Jenkins should 
apply to appropriate water to irrigate the land, that Pow-
elson should, at his own expense, break and level the land· 
and drill for water. That if Powelson secured two second 
feet of water, he should pay for the land the sufu of $500.00, 
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but if t\vo second feet of water was not obtained and the 
land was leased for the 1948 crop, Jenkins and Powelson 
should each receive one-half of the gross rental of the prop-
erty, and if Powelson operated the property for 1948 then 
.Jenkins should receive one-half of the net profits, exclud-
ing the cost of the machinery that might be purchased by 
Powelson. The agreement further provides that if posses-
sion and title was not acquired by September 1, 1947, then 
an action should be commenced and prosecuted and the 
parties should share equally in the costs· and recovery had 
for being deprived of the use and possession of the land for 
1948 and all subsequent years. 
Under date of August 20, 1947, application to approp-
riate 5 second feet of water was filed with the State En-
gineer of Utah·. :On Oct. 23, 1947, publication of notice of 
application to appropriate water was begun and on Nov. 
20, 1947, the publication was completed. The application 
was approved on Feb. 27, 1948. Proof of appropriation was 
by the application to be subJ?itted to the State Engineer on 
Jan. 5, 1950. On March 24, 1950, amendment for -change 
in Point of Diversion was approved. Proof of application 
of water was not submitted at the fixed time, but on Jan. 
7, 1950, the application was reinstated and the tim~ for 
making proof of beneficial use of the water applied for was 
extended to Jan. 5, 1952. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit G). On 
Dec. 6, 1948, the plaintiffs conveyed the land in question to 
David S. Powelson and Arnold Dewitt Trotter. (See plain-
tiffs' Exhibit C.) 
David S. Powelson, a witness called by the plaintiffs 
over objection of the defendants, testified in part: That the 
land was planted to erops in the Spring of 1950; that about 
25 acres was planted to potatoes and the remainder to 
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grain (Tr. 36). That about 75 or 80 acres were planted to 
dry grain and a!bout 30 acres to irrigated wheat; that the 
dry grain went about 15 bushel to the acre and the irrigated 
about 40 bushels (Tr. 37). That in 1946 or 1947 he went 
over the land with a Mr. Marcellus Palmer, a land special-
ist (Tr. 38); that they made borings on the land and exam-
ined the soil (Tr. 39); that the reasonable rental value of 
the land that was irrigated was, in his opinion, $30.00 per 
acre and the land that was not irrigated $10.00 per acre 
(Tr. 42-43). On cross-examination, Mr. Powelson testified 
in part: That he did not know of any dry land in Goshen 
Valley that rented for $10.00 an acre (Tr. 92); that he ren-
ted land under the Elberta Irrigation System for $30.00 per 
acre (Tr. 93). Mr. Powelson was asked these questions and 
gave these answers: 
.Q. "Well, it was a matter of speculation into the fu-
ture how much this land would produce if irrigated or if 
used as dry land, isn't that correct?" 
A. ''Well, you can only judge by the results; in the 
1950 crops is all.'' 
Q. ''Well, you couldn't tell in advance what this land 
would produce?'' 
A. "The only thing I could tell was that it was some 
of the best soil in the valley, and that is a natural conse-
quence of getting good production of crops." 
Q. "Well, it depended upon water supply, didn't it?" 
A. "Oh yes." 
. Q.- "And. it· didn't depend upon the weather?" 
A. "Oh yes, it would depend upon the weather." 
Q. "And also the rain fall and snow fall, is that cor-
rect?" 
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A. "That's right. The dry farm." 
Q. "And the sunshine." 
A. "The dry farm, yes." 
Q. "And also pests, didn't it?" 
A. "It depends upon a lot of things, yes." (Tr. 101). 
There \Vas also received in evidence an assignment, 
Exhibit I, by which Mr. David S. Powelson purports to as-
sign to Hyrum Jenkins and Belle Moyle Jenkins all of his 
claim for damages caused by withholding the land here in-
volved from his possession during the pendency of the ap-
peal. The assignment recites that .Mr. Powelson received 
$10.00 for the assignment, but he testified that he did not 
receive anything for the assignment, but that he paid $10.00 
to Mr. Jenkins' attorney for the assignment (Tr. 104). La-
ter Mr. Po\velson increased the amount to $50.00 or $60.00 
that he gave to be relieved from all liability in connection 
with the assignment and the contract (Tr. 105 and 179) . 
Mr. Powelson further testified that he absolutely will not 
get anything out of this lawsuit even if Mr. Jenkins prevails 
in getting judgment (Tr. 180) . Mr. Powelson also testified 
that the land in question had a rental value of between 10 
and 15c per acre per annum as grazing land {Tr. 41), and 
also that he developed about 1V2 second feet of water when 
he drilled the well (Tr. 177) ; that it cost him about $4,000.00 
to get the water for the 160 acres (Tr. 103). 
There is considera:ble evidence in the records as to the 
rental value of the land similar to that here involved, es-
pecially for use as grazing land. (See testimony of Merrill 
L. Oldroyd, who paid either $26.00 or $28.00 per annum 
for 560 acres (Tr. 50) and $20.00 for another tract of land 
consisting of 320 acres.) Albert Morgan placed the annual 
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rental value at 15c per acre (Tr. 121) ; that he saw the land 
operated by Powelson while it was planted to grain and po-
tatoes; that in 1951 barley was planted on the land but it 
was not all harvested (Tr. 132) ; that he saw the crop that 
was grown on the land in .1950 and in his opinion the wheat 
produced was less than 9 bushels per acre (Tr. 129); that 
he went $9.00 in the hole one year when he planted dry 
wheat (Tr. 124); that the potatoes raised were very small 
and about 2/3 of the crop was left on the ground (Tr. 130); 
that it looked like the crop was burning up between irriga-
tions (Tr. 131) ; part of the crop planted on the land in 1951 
was not harvested (Tr. 132). 
Rex White, a witness called by defendant, testified: That 
he owns land which is two rods north and 240 rods west of 
the land involved in this litigation, whieh land is comparable 
to the land here involved. That in the fall of 1947 he plowed 
35 acres of his land a~d planted it to barley which came up 
that fall and the following spring, but he couldn't have cut 
half a peck (Tr. 139). That in 1950 he planted his land 
to wheat; that it came up in the fall and next spring and 
looked like he would have·a bumper -crop, but it burned up 
during the summer and he could not have harvested half 
·a pound (Tr. 140); that he has leased his 35 acres for $10.00; 
that the rainfall on his land is about 9.38 inches; that the 
soil has been tested to a depth of 14 inches; that the rain-
fall on Powelson's property would be about the same as it 
is on his land (Tr. 145). 
Mr. Trotter, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified 
that he went onto the ground here involved for the purpose 
of breaking it up in June, 1949 (Tr. 154). Mr. Trotter, over 
objection of counsel for the defendants, further testified 
that in 1950 they got 1200 bushels from the dry land con-
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sisting of 80 acres, and 1885 bushels from the 27 acres that 
was irrigated, and they had 20 acres planted to potatoes 
· : (Tr. 155); that he is a grantee in the Deed from Jenkins, 
but he didn't pay anything for the land, but that he claims 
an undivided one-half interest in the land with Mr. Powel-
son (Tr. 158). 
Edgar Finch testified that land such as that here would 
rent at about 10c an acre and might rent for as high as a 
quarter an acre. That he does not know of any dry farm-
ing in the vicinity of Goshen (Tr. 182). Milton Buxton, a 
\vitness called by the defendants, testified th~t he has ren-
ted land similar to the land here involved for 3c per acre 
(Tr. 182) and another tract for 4c per acre (Tr. 193). That 
land in that vicinity sells for about $15.00 per acre (Tr. 195-
6). That he does not know of any dry land in Goshen Val-
ley having been rented for dry land farming (Tr. 196). 
Ned Okelberry, a witness called by defendants, testi-
fied that he bought 240 acres of land in the vi·cinity of the 
Jenkins property in 1944 or 1945 for $2.50 per acre (Tr. 
199-200). That he rented land near the Jenkins land in 
1947-1948 from the Tintic Standard Mining from 5 to 15c 
per acre; that this land is better for grazing than the J en-
Idns land; that he does not know of any land having been 
rented in Goshen V1alley for dry farming (Tr. 201). 
Milo Burriston testified that the Jenkins land was fit 
for grazing and as such has an annual rental value of 15e 
per acre; that he did not know of any land in Goshen Val-
ley that had been successfully used for dry land crops (Tr. 
204). 
Willis Morgan, one of the defendants, testified in his 
o"vn behalf: That the Jenkins property was fenced in 1949 
(Tr. 207); that no crops were grown on the land in 1949; 
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that crops were planted on the land in 1950 (Tr. 208); that 
some potatoes were planted but 2/3 of the crop was left on 
the ground (Tr. 209); that in 1951 the land was planted to 
barley but part of the crop was not harvested; that he ren-
ted 640 acres of land just North and West of the Jenkins 
land by paying the taxes (Tr. · 211-212) ; that the land is 
good spring pasture for cattle and better than the Jenkins 
land; that he had a conversation with Mr. Jenkins in 1947 
in which he said that he was not interested in his land and 
would not spend a dime on it (Tr. 213); That the total tax 
on the property here involved was $6.52 in 1948, $6.21 in 
1949, and $6.14 in 1950 (Tr. 215). 
Bert Morgan testified that the reasonable rental value 
of the land here involved in 1947 and 1948 was not to ex-
ceed 15 cents per acre per annum (Tr. 221); that he rents 
500 acres for $25.00 for grazing (Tr. 222). 
John B. Morgan, one of the defendants, testified in his 
own behalf, that he rented the land described as Defend-
ants' Exhibit 2, consisting of 247 acres for $36.00 per year; 
that the land so rented is a little less than one-half mile 
north of the Jenkins property (Tr. 229); that the Jenkins 
property cannot be used for grazing more than 2 or 3 weeks 
because that is as long as the feed lasts; that the 247 acres 
which he leases for $36.00 per year is much better than the 
Jenkins property for grazing (Tr. 230); that he owns land 
all around that of Jenkins; that his ground has sagebrush 
growing on it the same as the Jenkins land; that the rental 
value per acre per year is not to exceed 15c (Tr. 232); that 
he is paying $200.00 per year for 43 acres of irrigated land 
which is situated 2Y2 miles North of the Jenkins land (Tr. 
233). 
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We have directed the attention of the Court to the fore-
going evidence which is not in any sense a complete ·tran-
script, but as this is an action at· law, the eVidence so re-
ferred- to, as we view it, is more than ample to support the; 
judgment rendered by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
We shall discuss the two points which ·plaintiffs desig~: 
nate in their brief· a·s the basis of their claim that the judg.: 
merit appealed from should be reversed in the order in which· 
the same are mentioned in appellants' brief. It is, of course, 
elementary that this,- being an action at law, the· findings' 
of the trial court must be sustained if there is substantial. 
evidence to sustain the same. Such is the mandate of Ar-
ticle 8, Section 9 of our State Constitution, where· it pr~ 
vides that the appeal (from-District· Courts) shall--"in 
case at law- be on questions of law alone." Such is also our' 
statutory law and the repeated 'cind'uniform holding of 'this 
Court. U. C~ A. 1943, 104..:41-1 and cases cited iri foot notes 
thereto in VoL 6, page -392,- note 49. · 
ANSWER TO POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COP~T DID N()T ERR I~ CONCLLJP~· 
ING TIIAT.THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THiE DAM-· 
AGES SHOULD ~E THE RENTAL VALUE OF THE 
LfWI). AS GRAZING AND NOT ~AS AGRICULTURAL. 
LAND. 
The evidence shows without conflict these facts: 
The appeal bond upon which this action is prosecuted 
was executed on September 2,.1947 (See Exhibit A, which 
is attached to plaintiffs' Complaint R. 5-8).. The Remittitur 
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affirming the cause was filed in the District Court on Sept. 
9, 1948. It is so alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 4). 
And so found by the trial court (R. 14) . '"fh us the plaintiffs 
were deprived of the possession of the land for one year and 
one week. It was not until Feb. 27, 1948, that the applica-
tion to appropriate water on the land was approved (See 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). Thus neither the plaintiffs nor Mr. 
Powelson could lawfully have drilled a well until after Feb. 
27, 1948. Moreover, notwithstanding the plaintiffs or Mr. 
Powelson could have taken possession of the land on or after 
September 9, 1948, nothing was done by way of drilling a 
well for water until along in 1949 and did not start break-
ing up the land until August, 1949 (Tr. 97). The first crop 
was planted in 1950 (Tr. 98). The plaintiffs parted with 
their title on December 6, 1948. 
It is thus obvious that the land here in question was 
not and could not have been used as irrigated land during 
the time it was owned by the plaintiffs. No claim is made 
or could reasonably be made that water could have· been 
made available for irrigation for the growing seaso~ of 
1948. That being so, there is no basis for the claim that 
plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages on the claim that 
their land should be considered as irrigated ,agricultural 
lands during the time that they were the owners thereof. 
The difficulty with the claim for damages on the basis 
that the land in question should be regarded as agricultural 
lands lies deeper than the fact that no water could lawfully 
be made available for the irrigation of such lands for the 
growing season of 1948. 
While Mr. Powelson, a witness for plaintiffs, testified 
that the reasonable rental value of the Jenkins land as dry 
land was $10.00 per acre and as irrigated land $30.00 per 
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acre, other witnesses testified to the contrary, and the sur-
rounding facts belie any such claimed rPntal value as that 
testified to by Po\ve lson. 
1~he testhnony in th~ case, son1e of which \Ve have· here-
tofore directed to the attention of the Court, shows that 
there is a large amount of land similar to and in the im-
mediate vicinity of the Jenkins property and including the 
Jenkins property that has never been devoted to the raising 
of either dry land or irrigated agricutural crops. Through-
out the years such of this land as has been leased brought 
a rental of up to 15c an acre per annum for use as grazing 
lands. The Jenkins land was of so little value for any pur-
pose that so far as appears, it had never been rented and 
Mr. Jenkins stated that he would not spend a dime to re-
tain it. If the land had any such rental value as that now 
claimed by the appellants, it is, to say the least, extremely 
unlikely that the owners thereof would not have rented it 
for some such fabulous price as $10.00 to $30.00 per acre, 
during the time they or their predecessors were the owners 
thereof. So also if these lands had any such a rental value, 
it is, to say the least, extremely rmlikely that Mr. Jenkins 
would be willing to sell the same for Y2 of income derived 
therefrom for the year 1948 plus $500.00 if a flow of two 
second feet of water was obtained by the drilling of a well. 
That is all that plaintiffs were to receive for the property 
Wlder the provisions of the agreement, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
B, and if possession- could not be obtained by September 1, 
1947, and a suit was necessary to recover possession, the 
plaintiffs were, by the contract, obligated to pay one-half 
of the court costs and were entitled to only one-half of the 
amount of the recovery. People with property of a rental 
value of from $1600.00 to $4800.00 a year do not sell their 
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property for any such pittahce as that provided in the agree-
ment, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B. Nor is it likely that one owning 
property with a rental value of from $1600.00 to $4800.00 
a year can get off with the payment of an annual general 
tax of less than $7.00. 
So also if the witness David· S. Powelson actually be· 
lieved that he and plaintiff, Hyrum Jenkins, were entitled 
to share and share alike damages as provided in Plaintiffs' . 
Exhibit B on the basis of the land having a rental value :in 
the amount testified to by him, it would indeed seem strange 
that he would· be willing to pay the sum of $50.00 or $60.00 
to get Jenkins to accept the assignment, Exhibit I, and-re-
lieve him from further liability, yet that is the effect. of his 
testimony (Tr. 104-105). 
Moreover, the testimony of Mr. Powelson to the effect· 
that the Jap was willing to pay $10.00 for that part of the 
Jenkins land- that was not supplied with water and $30.00 
for that which was ·supplied with water is so improbable: 
that the Court might well ·have disbelieved the same.· It 
is apparent that the Jap could have rented land without 
wat~r· apparently as good as the Jenkins land for a few 
cents-per acre. There was no lahd,in the immediate neigh-
borhood of the -Jenkins land that had been demonstrated 
to be profitable for raising dry la:nd grain. On the contrary, 
Albert 'Morgan had gone $27.00 behind in the ope'ration of 
40 acres of. dry land in the immediate vicinity of the Jen-
kins property, (Tr. 124).- So far as appears, the conversa-
tion had with the Jap, testified to by Mr. ·Powelson, may. 
have been just loose talk. In any event, the· Jap did not, 
so far aS' is· made to appear, ex·amine the-land, and the wit-
ness .p:owelsori· conveniently had the ·Jap iri ,California at 
the, time of the triat 
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Still another fatal weakness to plaintiffs' claim of a 
right to damages on the basis that the land here involved 
was fit for raising agricultural crops is the fact that it would 
be a matter of pure speculation as to whether or not such 
use would be profitable. Plaintiffs' principal witness, David 
S. Powelson, so testified (Tr. 100-101). 
During the trial, counsel for the plaintiffs stated that 
the present action was to recover the value of the use of 
the property as agricultural ground and not for profits 
that might be derived from its operation (Tr. 111). How-
ever, considerable evidence was received over objection of 
counsel for the defendants which was directed to the ques-
tion of profits, and some of the cases cited by counsel for 
plaintiffs in their brief are directed to the question of pro-
fits. Indeed some of the language quoted, such as that 
from the case of Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., et al, 241 Pac. 
(2d) 1914, quoted on page 11 of appellants' brief, would 
seem to indicate that plaintiffs claim the right to recover 
damages without regard to whether such damages are <?n 
the theory of rental value or prospective profits and also 
without regard to how uncertain, contingent or speculative 
such damages might be. However, in the case of Moorhead 
v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 165 N. W. 484, L. R. A. 1918 C 391, 
cited and quoted from on page 11 of appellants' brief, it 
will be seen that damages tha_t may properly be awarded 
must be "free of uncertain, contingent, conjectural or spec-
ulative elements." The authorities generally teach that "a 
party to a contract who is injured by another's breach of 
the contract, is entitled to recover from the latter damages 
for all injuries and only such injuries as are the direct, nat-
ural and proximate result of the breach, or which in the 
ordinary course of events would likely result from a breach 
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and can reasonably be said to have been foreseen, contem-
plated, or expected by the parties at the time when they 
made the contract as a probable or natural result of a 
breach, including gains prevented as well as losses sus-
tained." 15 Am. Jur. Sec. 51, page 449-450, and cases cited 
in the foot notes. 
Another rule applied by the courts as to the measure 
of damages is thus expressed in 15 Am. Jur. Sec. 55, page 
459: 
"In general, it may be said that in measuring the 
damages for the breach of a contract, a supposedly suc-
cessful collateral operation that a party might have 
made if he had not been prevented from realizing the 
proceeds of the contract at the time stipulated cannot 
be taken into consideration. This is the rule not only 
because of the uncertain and contingent issue of such 
an operation in itself, but because it has no legal or 
necessary connection with the stipulations between the 
parties, and cannot therefore be presumed to have en-
tered into their consideration at the time of contract-
ing. It has accordingly been held that the loss of any 
speculation or enterprise in which a party may have 
embarked, relying on the proceeds to be derived from 
the fulfillment of an existing contract, constitutes no 
part of the damages to be recovered in case of breach, 
and no recovery can be had for losses resulting from 
inability. to make or carry out a collateral contract, 
such as the loss of anticipated profits, or for expenses 
incurred in preparation f.or its performance, where the 
party breaking the original contract had not notice of 
the existing or contemplated collateral agreement.'' 
~s to the recovery of profits the law is thus stated in 
15 Am. J ur. · Sec. 152, page 564: 
4
'To warrant a recovery fior loss of profits in an 
action for breach of a contract, it must be made to ap-
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, pear that such loss of profits was the natural and proxi-
mate, not the remote, result or consequence of the 
breach of the contract and such as may reasonably be 
supposed to have been within the contemplation of the 
parties when the contract was made as the probable 
result of its breach. It is further necessary that it be 
reasonably certain that profits would have been rea-
lized except for the breach of the contract. When pros-
pective profits are remote, conjectural and speculative, 
thy cannot be said to be the direct and unavoidable re-
sult of the breach and cannot be recovered." 
Numerous cases are cited in the foot notes to the text, 
which support the same. 
Applying the doctrine announced in the foregoing text 
and the cases cited in the foot notes, there would seem to 
be no escape from the conclusion that it was at best a mat-
ter of speculation as to whether any profits would or could 
be realized from devoting the land here involved for raising 
cultivated crops. No success had theretofore been made 
on any lands in that immediate vicinity and there had been 
some failures, notably that of Albert Morgan on land ad-
jacent to the Jenkins land (Tr. 124) . 
We have probably needlessly digressed somewhat from 
the theory upon which this case was tried and decided. As 
heretofore pointed out, ·counsel for the plaintiffs stated at 
the trial that plaintiffs sought to recover the reasonable 
rental value of the property and not any profits that might 
have been realized. 
That the sole basis of the recovery by the plaintiffs is 
the reasonable rental value of the land is further borne out 
by the bond which provides that if the judgment is affirmed 
the sureties will be liable for the payment of damages "occa-
sioned by waste and the value of the use and occupancy of 
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the property from the time of the appeal until the delivery 
of possession thereof to said plaintiff." The provisions of 
the supersedeas bond just quoted is in conformity with RUle 
73d of Utah Rules of Civil Precedure. 
In light of the fact that the land involved in this liti-
gation was not fenced, was in its native state, covered wirth 
sagebrush, native grasses and weeds; that such land as had 
been devoted to raising of dry wheat in the immediate vicin-
ity of these lands had proven a failure; that no permit had 
been granted, or was granted until the year 1948 by the 
State Engineer to drill a vvell for water, and the fact that 
before the land could be broken up and planted to crops 
and water secured to irrigate the same it was necessary to 
spend several thousand dollars and even then the venture 
might well prove a failure, it is, to say the least, extremely 
improbable that anyone would pay a rental of more than 
that awarded by the trial court for the use of the land dur-
ing the one year and one week that elapsed between t~e 
time the supersedeas bond was executed and the time the 
plaintiffs were restored to the possession of the land. Cer-
tain it is that David S. Powelson was not willing, or if he 
was he did not undertake to pay the plaintiffs any such ren-
tal'as that to which he testified was· the reasonable rental 
thereof. 
Further as to that, even though this Court should not 
agree with the findings of the trial court, , sucll fact does 
not authorize this Court to reverse the findings of the trial 
court in this, an action at ·law. In this connection, it may 
be noted that the finder of the facts is not boillld to believe 
. opinion or evidence as to the rental value of a tract of land 
·even if such evidence is uncontradicted. 
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We have read the cases and authorities cited by appel-
lants. So far as we can find, none of them announce any 
other or different doctrine than is announced in the general 
principles of law stated by the authorities which we have 
heretofore quoted. That being so, no useful purpose will 
be served by a detailed discussion of such cases. At the 
bottom of page 17 of appellants' brief, the statement is made 
that plaintiffs should be awarded a judgment for damages 
for a period of t\vo years. It is said that it was physically 
impossible to break the ground until September 9, 1948, 
at which time it was impossible rto break the ground for the 
1949 crop. If it was impossible to break the ground for 
the 1949 crop after September 9, 1948, it necessarily fol-. 
lows that it was impossible to break the ground after Sep-
tember 2, 1947, for the 1948 crape It will be seen that the 
plaintiffs were deprived of the use of the land only one week 
more than one year. 
There is a total absence of any evidence that the ren-
tal value of the property in question for one week is equiva-
lent to its rental value for a whole year or that· plaintiffs 
sustained damage for a whole year because defendants had 
possession of the land for a week beyond the year. 
An attempt was made to show that a man was avail-
able to break up the land in September of 1947, but was 
not available in Septernber of 1~48. Obviously, the avail-
ability or lack of availability, even if contrary to defend-
ants' evidence, if true, such fact is not a proper element to 
consider in awarding damages. 
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ANSWER TO POINT ll 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING THE 
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIF·FS AND THEIR WTNESSES 
TOUCHING THE QUESTION OF WHAT HAS BEEN 
DONE WITH THIS PROPERTY SINCE THE DEED WAS 
MADE FROM JENKINS TO POWELSON AND TROT-
TER ON DECEMBER 6, 1948, OR IN STRIKING ALL 
OF THE TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO AN 0'RAL CON-
TRACT OR CONVERSATION BETWEEN BOWELSON 
AND THE JAP, WillCH WAS RECEIVED AS BEARING 
ON THE RENTAL VALUE OR VALUE OF THE USE OF 
THE PRDPERTY (Tr. 262). 
Beginning on page 18 of appellants' brief, complaint i~ 
made because the court struck some evidence which plain-
tiffs claim to be pertinent to determine the use of the prop-
erty involved in this action. While the appellants fail to 
point out with particularity the evidence which they claim 
was improperly stricken, we assume it was the testimony 
above referred to. There seems to be no other testimony 
· stricken that could be meant. 
We have no quarrel with the statement of counsel for 
plaintiffs to the effect that one who is deprived of the use 
of his property is entitled to damages on the basis of the 
reasonable rental value of his property when used for the 
most profitable use for which the property is adapted. We, . 
however, are unable to see how that fact supports plain-
tiffs' claim that the Court should consider facts that oc-
curred after plaintiffs had been put into possession. of their 
property and after they had parted with their title to the 
property. So far as appears, there was no one in the Go-
shen Valley or interested in renting land therein who was 
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possessed of the attainments of a clairvoyant. As we have 
heretofore pointed out in this brief, plaintiffs are, accord-
ing to their pleading and the statement of their counsel, 
seeking to recover the reasonable rental value of their land 
during the time they were deprived of the use thereof. That 
is to say, such rental as a person who is willing but not re-
quired to rent will pay in a transaction or lease agreement 
with one who is willing but not.required to let the land. 
Obviously persons without the faculty of foresee~g in-
to the future could not be influenced in making a contract 
for the lease of a tract of land far in excess of the going 
····price. Certain it is that the plaintiffs were not possessed 
with such attairl..ments, or they would not have sold for a 
mere pittance a tract of land which, according to the state-
ment of.their attorney on page 21 of their brief, had an an-
nual rental value of $2810.00. Nor did the court below err 
in striking the testimony of the witness David S. Powelson 
as to the alleged conversation of the Jap as to what the 
Jap would pay for the rental of the Jenkins property. City 
of St. Louis v. Gerhart Realty_ Co., 40 S. W. (2d) 661; 328 
Mo. 103; Consolidated Gas Service Co. v. Tyler, 63 Pac. 
(2d) 88; 178 Old. 325. U. S. v. Meyer C. C. A., 111, 113 F. 
(2d) 387. Sharp v. U. S. 191 U. S. 341; 24 S. Ct. 114. This 
Court in the case of Ogden L. and I R. Co. v. Jones, 51 Utah 
62; 168 Pac. 548, at page 551 of the Pacific Reporter says 
that it is improper for a land owner in a condemnation pro-
ceeding to testify to an offer made for the land sought to 
be condemned. 
For the court below to have given any weight to the 
testimony of the witness Powelson as to the offer claimed 
to have been made by the Jap, would have been whoUy un-
justified. At the tin1e of the trial, the Jap was in California 
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and not· available as a witness. If he had been questioned 
about the alleged conversation, we, of course, do not know 
what his testimony would have been. However, it is cer-
tain that he would not pay any such rental as that testified · 
to by Mr. Powelson until the land was cleared of brush, nor 
is it claimed that he would have paid a rental of $30.00 an 
acre for land until water was available. As is said by some 
of the cases above cited, it would open wide the door to 
fraud to admit evidence of an offer to buy or lease land, 
and in our investigation we have found no case that has 
approved the admission of such evidence. 
We submit the judgment appealed from should be af-
firmed with costs to respondents. . 
RespeCtfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
./ 
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